Abstract
The late 20th century and the start of the 21st century have ushered in what is generally regarded as the digital revolution. The digital age was preceded by what is referred to as the industrial revolution during which two world wars have been fought. During this era states were indeed the dominant actors in International relations. However, this paper examines the emerging role of transnational non-state actors in the expanding cyber dimension of the digital age. The conceptual framework argues that due to the diffusion of power in the cyber space dimension transnational non-state actors are filling the gap in issues that are beyond the scope of state actors. The theoretical framework will use main stream IR theories to examine the increasing relevance of non-state actors in International Relations. The paper argues that since state actors are not willing to cede control of power a mutual comprise may be prudent to addressing the challenges of the digital age. On the normative aspects the paper will examine the role on transnational non-state actors in setting up the rules, regulations and standards that define and control cyberspace dimension. It will also examine how the interdependence of state and non-state actors is mutually beneficial. The empirical analysis will examine using case studies the role of transnational non-state actors in e-governance and cybersecurity issues. The case studies will clearly highlight the role non-state actors have that are out of the scope of state actors. The paper concludes with the recommendation that state actors need to collaborate with transnational non-state actors to address the challenges of e-governance and cyber security. This collaboration in the digital age may be key for any claim to legitimacy in an abstract, undefined cyberspace dimension where power is diffused.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The dynamics of power in the digital age have since changed and is transitioning from a physical or material space to a virtual space. The intangible virtual environment has presented a paradoxical situation where the major state powers of the world have found themselves vulnerable to attacks by insignificant non-state actors in war or conflict that is asymmetrical in nature. Various global security issues have arisen as a consequence, for example, cybersecurity. For example social media platforms have the capacity to live stream videos to billions of people. However, the problem with this is that there is no algorithm sophisticated enough to detect violence — or anything else that is illegal — in live streaming videos. Thus there are substantial policy gaps in the area of e-governance where the global governance capacity of states and non-state actors are limited.
Non-state actors have come up with policies that govern issues especially if they are transnational in nature. In emphasizing the emerging role of transnational non-state actors in the digital era, Nye[1] explains that the spread of information means that power is now more widely distributed and informal networks will undermine the monopoly of states. The challenge states have now is the inability to dominate and control issues around e-governance and cyber security due to the abstract nature of the cyber dimension.
Krasner posits[2] that states have relinquished control over issues they cannot control. These issues are also what coincidentally are forming the global agenda. In the cyberspace dimension, no state can claim dominance. However, states with enhanced capacities still push their agenda especially when national interest is at stake. Robert Keohane andJoseph Nye[3] were among the first scholars to observe the need for rules to govern the cyberspace. This they argued was to not only protect users against cybercrime but also to ensure intellectual property rights are respected.
This paper will examine these two different school of thoughts with regard to who among state or non-state actors plays the major role in issue around e-governance and cybersecurity.
2.0 CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
2.1 E-GOVERNANCE
Fukuyama[4] defines governance as a government’s ability to deliver services, to make and enforce rules, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not. The concept of “governance” is not new. It is as old as human civilization. In other words governance means the process of decision-making and the process through which decisions are implemented or not implemented[5]. Dawes[6] builds on this definition by positing that e-governance incorporates the use of information and communication technologies to support public services, government administration, democratic processes and relationships among citizens, civil society, the private sector and the state. Governments indeed are important actors in e-governance. However this paper focuses on the emerging role of non-state actors in the context of e-governance defined above.
2.2 CYBER SECURITY
Oxford dictionary defines Cyber security as the state of being protected against the criminal or unauthorized use of electronic data, or the measures taken to achieve this.[7]The international telecommunications union provides a more detailed definition. ITU defines Cybersecurity as the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can beused to protect the cyber space environment, the organizations and users within the same dimension[8] Cyberspace as a phenomenon has brought a new dimension to international relations (IR). The potential for cyberspace conflicts to posing threats to national security post the development of nuclear weapons in the 1940s was first pointed by Cobb in 1999. Governments are highly concerned with the protection of cyberspace. Cyberspace has been cited as the fifth domain of warfare after land, sea, air and space.[9]
2.3 TRANSNATIONAL NON-STATE ACTORS
Keohane and Nye explained transnational actors as the actors interacting across state boundaries where at least one non-state agent is party to the relations. Transnational relations they posited, were unique in that they represented “contacts, collaborations, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the foreign policy organs of the state.[10] Nye and Welch also note that a characteristic of the digital age is the increase scope of transnational, non-state actors interacting across international borders.[11]
The conceptual framework thus seeks to examine these concepts and their interrelation in context on international relations. Both international governing organizations (IGOs) and transnational non-state actors influence E-Governance by creating a form of transnational governance model. Thismodel has several layers of institutional and organizational structures interacting at the individual, state and global level.[12]
Transnational governance has become increasingly important in the past two decades and consists of network-oriented non-state actors such as INGOs, activists among others. Experts have advised governments of the need to have regulatory frameworks that oversee multilayered systems like e-governance and issues with global impacts like cybersecurity[13]. Dingwerth[14] distinguishes this form of transnational governance from the state driven global governance by acknowledging the key role of non-state actors in coordination of cross border activities. The paper argues that indeed non-state actors and state actors have crucial roles and influence each other.
To quote columnist Thomas Friedman[15] contemporary globalization goes farther, faster, cheaper and deeper. This means the world has become more interconnected.Stiglitz[16] posits that a knowledge based economy triggers innovations which then causes a chain reaction of new inventions. This spreads quickly due to the interdependence and interconnectedness of networks in a contemporary globalized world. As a result areas such as e-governance haveseen a proliferation of transnational non-state actors due to this characteristic of globalization.
Data in Figure 2 for IGOs from 1920–40 are from Michael Wallace and J. David Singer,“Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System,1815–1964: A Quantitative Description,” International Organization 24, no. 2 (1970): 239–87. Comparable data for INGOs from 1920–1950 are unavailable
Technology has created contributed to the network of complex interdependence discussed above. Governments has always been preoccupied with the flow of information between their borders. Historically the invention of the printing press by Johann Gutenberg empowered the European populace to be inspired by Martin Luther writings and thus leading to the Reformation movement.[17] The digital revolution which some scholars refer to as the “third industrial revolution” bares similarities to this historical event. The digital information age is based on rapid advances in communications, software and computers. This advances have changed the nature of national and global governance, sovereignty, and redistributed power among state and non-state actors. In this context non-state actors in economic and information networks have adapted faster than state actors to the changes mentioned.[18]
These non-state actors include NGOs, international organizations, commercial, and scientific agencies of all kinds. The transnational practices, global interactions, and networked technological structures of non-state actors have added a new crucial layer to their relationshipswith states. Analytically, the multiplicity of actors, which is well recognized by research on global governance is why the paper examines the emerging role of transnational actors.[19]
As technologies evolve some non-state actors are taking advantage of new software and hardware developments. Technical, organizational/institutional, and cultural weaknesses are being exploited by individuals, firms, non-state actors like terrorists and cybercrime syndicates as well as states not fully committed to the emerging international rules and norms.[20] Thus in response transnational non-state actors especially in the private commercial sector have come up with e-governance structures to deal with issues like cyber security.
Also new forms of socio-economic and political interaction, mostly based on new technologies, have also caused some scholars to reassess the role of non-state actors in global affairs. The digital age has increased the capacity of individuals to use ICTs for the collection and dissemination of information as well as for the transnational mobilization of like-minded individuals for various socio-political and economic purposes.[21]
3.0 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
For realists, the distribution of power in the world in the digital era can is viewed in a three-dimensional manner. On security issues, the world could be argued to be a unipolar one due to the power and military resources available to the USA. On economic issues, the international system is a multipolar one with USA, China, Japan, Europe, and others not mention creating a balance of power status quo in this dimension. The third, least influential dimension is one of the transnational relations or globalization (cyberspace) that crosses borders and is out of the scope of most states’ control.This dimension has a dispersed and even structure of power where non-state actors are as empowered as states in certain cases. In the context of this paper realist practitioners struggle with how to enforce E-governance on a global level as they do on a national level since most of the issues are out of their scope. Barnett and Duvall note that governance links to power through questions like ‘who governs?’, however, significantly in the context of e-governance, ‘how are institutions designed to check the potential abuse of power?’ Thus since most cyberspace issues are out of the scope states, the actor who controls the institutions which govern those issues is critical for realists.[22]
However realists and neo realist still remain skeptic of globalization. They doubt technology driven globalization such as that in the cyberspace dimension has transformed the processes and structures of the international system.[23][24][25][26] Other realists like Nye and Keohane argue that to maintain their dominance on issues around E-governance and cyber security on the global stage an approach of using soft power backed up by hard power is the ideal one considering the how abstract the internet or the cyberspace dimension is.[27] Realists also realize that, in a digital era where information flows freely, and transnational channels of contact have expanded across sovereign borders and global markets, non-state actors are playing a larger role in the international system.[28][29]
Theory Social constructivists believe that fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. Thomas Weiss argues that debates about global governance emerged from a growing realization amongst IR scholars in the 1970s and 1980s that both a realist state-based approach and liberal-institutionalist theories which focused on interdependence were failing to adequately incorporate the ‘vast increase, in both numbers and influence, of non-state actors and the implications of technology in an age of globalization’.[30] Through social globalization, cultures, ideas and people have spread worldwide aided by the advancement of technology. Indeed as constructivists would point out transnational political ideas such as the anti-apartheid, environmental, feminists, anticolonial and antislavery movements have affected how states construct their goals or use soft power.[31]
In this context science and technology has impacted how states relate to each other. Non-state actors have increasingly looked beyond the limited materialistic approach of states to work together on issues that require global coordination, for example, climate change or even e-governance of the cyberspace.[32] Wendt notes that the structures of human association are primarily by shared ideas rather than material ones.[33] Thus the digital era had given rise to ideas that have shaped how transnational non-state actors think that global issues are handled. This is in opposition to the realist school of thought.
Constructivists also challenge the neorealist school of thought that an anarchic international structure is what creates a self-help system where states pursue their selfish interests for survival. In a digital age, where especially information technology has changed the way individuals, states, public and private institutions social interact, constructivists argue this is what determines the structure of the international system rather than an assumption that human nature and by extension states are selfish actors. In the context of e-governance, which involves a multi-level structure, there are cases where international organizations are involved in the processes of social constructions of actors’ perceptions of their interests.
Finnemore, for example, analyzed the international structure in the context meaning and social value rather than of power. She gives an example in her research of how states created science bureaucracies due to the influence UNESCO a non-state actor.[34][35]
Regime theory has been advanced in response to the mutual constraints imposed by nuclear weapons, increased technological interconnections, and trans-boundary flows between nations[36]. Advances in science and technology has led to an interconnectednesswhich has provided opportunities for state and non-state actors to affect others on a global scale. Keohane notes that institutions of global governance need to limit the negative aspects of this decentralized actions.[37]
Other major strands of international relations theories perceive transnational actors differently, according to their stance on the role of states and their assessment of changes in the international system. Among neo-realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, neo-marxist and constructivist theories, realists and neo-marxists have a negative attitude towards transnational non-state actors. For realists, state sovereignty and power are fundamental as analytical categories, thus the power of transnational actors is rarely acknowledged. While Marxists examine transnational relations on the basis of the internationality of class struggles. Critical theorists tend to be pessimistic about transactional actors; seeing them as market-based agents such as multinational corporates thus by extension an arm of capitalism. [38]
4.0 NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
As early as the 14th century medieval merchants developed Lex Mercatoria “Merchant Law” which was basically a private set of rules which governed the way they conducted business. Similarly, in this digital age, everyone from individual hackers to large MNCs are developing norms and code of the internet outside the control of state actors. Transnational non-state actors for example have created private space through the help of advances in encryption technology thus appropriated a public space (internet) for private use.[39]These private spaces have been dedicated to specific issues like human rights, technology, environment and entertainment. These spaces do not challenge state sovereignty but add another level of relations states do not effectively control.
Globalization enabled by advances in technology has transformed then role of transnational non-state actors. Traditional state dominated IGOS rely on hierarchical bureaucracies and government support. Whereas the networks formed by transnational non-state actors have a nonhierarchical structure and are more inclusive. These transnational networks include the private sector, governments and civil society who pursue common goals with global implications. While these transnational networks lack from political legitimacy or recognition, states and IGOs increasingly welcome their expertise.[40]
However there have been efforts from state actors in setting up regimes and institution through international law that can provide guidance in the areas of e-governance and cyber security.These include, in particular,
- The 1992 Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union[41]
- The 2001 Budapest Convention on Cybercrime[42]
- The 2009 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s Information Security Agreement[43]
- The 2014 African Union’s Cyber Security Convention[44]
Although important, these international treaties govern only a small portion of activities in the cyberspace dimension. The cyberspace dimension is not a lawless territory beyond the scope of international law but for now there is no complex regulatory mechanism governing state cyber activities. [45] Moreover, states tend to be reluctant to engage themselves in the interpretation and development of international law applicable to cyber space dimension for example cyber security. This voluntary retreat has created a power vacuum, enablingtransnational non-state actors to move into the space left by states and pursue various forms of ‘norm entrepreneurship’.[46]
Space exploration for several decades was a two state affair between the US and Soviet Union.In contrast cyberspace id primarily occupied by non-state actors like individuals, MNCs, civil society and more who have transnational connections[47]. Anonymity online of cyberspace activities and the dispersion of power to these non-state actors has been at the expense of state actors.[48]The complex environment created by the involvement of state and non-state actors in the cyberspace dimension has led legal uncertainty especially with regard to international law. Transnational non-state actors have now taken over the role of states in norm creation for international law in the area of cyberspace. These advances are driven primarily by academia and MNCs for example the Tallinn Manual project and the Microsoft’s cyber norms proposal. [49]
5.0 Empirical Analysis: ICANN, Microsoft and the Tallinn Manual as Case Studies in the Emerging Role of Transnational Non-state actors in E-Governance and Cyber Security
As noted before in this paper, international governmental organizations (IGOs) and transnational non-state actors influence e-governance by creating a form of transnational governance model. This model has several layers of institutional and organizational structures interacting at the individual, state and global level.[50] A key example of this multi-layered, hybrid transnational organization is ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers).This organization is a regulatory body in the information and telecommunications sector which deals with issues around internet governance and policy formulation.[51]Other examples the paper examines include Microsoft which is a multinational corporation and the Tallinn manual, a paper prepared by experts for the international community touching on the acceptable norms of the cyberspace dimension. This case studies examine the crucial role non-state actors have taken in managing the internet which some consider a common good for the use of all individuals regardless of their location.
Microsoft
In December 2014 Microsoft published a proposal entitled International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World.[52] Microsoft’s proposal was the first comprehensive attempt of setting specific standards of behavior. Despite being a private institution Microsoft was proposing six cyber security norms that were purporting to regulate the conduct of states.[53] The main purported aim of the white paper was to minimize thepossibility of that ICT products and services would be exploited by states as part of military operations. [54]
Tallinn Manual
In 2013 Professor Michael Schmitt led a group of international experts in publishing the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare.[55] Although the project was hosted by NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE), the content of the Manual is credited as reflecting the only the views of the experts rather than the states from which they originate.[56]
The Manual was prepared in the context of military paradigm and focused on law on the use of force (jus ad bellum) and the law of armed conflict (jus in bello).[57] The Manual identifies 95 rules that were adopted by consensus among the group of experts whose goals were to mirror customary international law.[58] The main aim of the Manual is to explain how existing legal norms apply to conduct in cyberspace.[59]
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICANN through its processes makes keys decisions as to how the internet is use, how it is controlled and how is grows. Key mechanisms have been put in place to determine who participates in its governance, whose input is valued more and who are made accountable for decisions taken. The decisions and processes of ICANN have the capacity to impact national economies, influence national identity formation and undermine sovereignty of states. This of course has deep implications for global politics.[60]
As a private sector organization, ICANN faces challenges that impact its governance since the policies it formulates are felt globally. This has brought about questions about its legitimacy since it’s a private body. With regard to international politics the fact that the Unites States government has a major role in the oversight of ICANN also dents it legitimacy as a neutral body. Questioning ICANN legitimacy has implications for US power since it is through the internet that the US leveraged the growth of its economy globally. The concept of legitimacy is key to this case study since it helps us to understand the soft power approach the US as a hegemon has taken towards governance ICANN. Other states were uncomfortable with the US hegemony over Internet governance since they felt it would threaten their interests.[61] As the political nature of Internet governance became clear other states questioned whose interests were being promoted by ICANN’s processes and the US’s influence on key decisions about technology.[62]
The US government ultimately faced challenges to its legitimacy as the hegemonic power in ICANN. This was because other states did not want to allow the US to have unilateral control of system most of the world relied on.[63]However the US realized the potential of ICANN as a source of power. They were able to shape Internet governance to promote their agenda of economic growth. This led to the expansion of US economic might globally especially after the end of the Cold war.[64]But this strategy led to a struggle for power for the US and a struggle for legitimacy for ICANN. The US negotiated a series of concessions with the international community which led to it giving up control over Internet governance for ICANN to take charge. This was the only way US could get legitimate support for its global economic agenda without undermining it material power objectives.[65]
The issue of internet governance and by extension e-governance and who control it relies on legitimacy. However due to the selfish, self-help nature of the international system state control over governance structures would reduce its legitimacy. In contrast when states relinquish control and allow non-state actors, experts to set up the structures a degree of legitimacy is attached to that process.[66][67]
6.0 CONCLUSION
Decisions made about how the cyberspace is used, how it grows and how it is controlled tend to be mostly out of the scope of states and non-state actors alike. Howeveras examined by the paper using examples of e-governance and cybersecurity, states are no longer the only prominent actors in global issues. Globalization and the advancement of science and technology has led to the emergence of key roles for non-state actors to fulfil on the global stage. E-governance structures with clear processes, rules and norms need to be institutionalized to determine who participates in governance, whose voices count and which decision-makers are held accountable. These processes and decisions affect national economies, impact on national identity formation and undermine sovereignty in some critical ways.[68] Indeed, they have profound political implications. It is crucial that decisions makers both from state and non-state actors work together to create the institutions which will govern the cyberspace. Both state and non-state actors also need to ensure that the institutions governing the cyberspace are inclusive since this will ensure the processes of rulemaking and decision making are considered legitimate on the global stage.
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[2]Stephen Krasner., Sovereignty.Foreign Policy. (2001) 121: 24
[3]Robert O. Keohane, and Joseph P. Nye., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age,” .Foreign Affairs.(1998) 77 (5): 81–94.
[4]Francis Fukuyama, “What Is Governance?”, Center for Global Development. CGD Working Paper 314. Washington, DC, 2013.
[5]https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/go.od-governance.pdf
[6]Sharon S. Dawes,“The Evolution and Continuing Challenges of E-Governance,”Public Administration Review (2008) 68:86-102.
[7]https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cybersecurity
[8]ITU. 2009. Overview of Cybersecurity. Recommendation ITU-T X.1205. Geneva: International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
[9] economist.com, 2010
[10] Robert O. Keohaneand Joseph P. Nye, Eds., Transnational relations and world politics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p.11
[11]Joseph S. Nye and David A. Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history (Boston: Pearson, 2017), p.346
[12]Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin‐Andersson., Transnational governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation. (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
[13] Thiel, Markus and Jeffrey Maslanik , Transnational Actors Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, 2010
[14]Klaus Dingwerth,The new transnationalism. (New York, Palgrave, 2007), p.2
[15]Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. (New York. Picador, 2012)
[16]Joseph E. Stiglitz, Intellectual property rights, the pool of knowledge, and innovation. (Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2014)
[17]Nye and Welch, Understanding global conflict and cooperation: An introduction to theory and history, 329.
[18]Daniel, Bell. The cultural contradictions of capitalism, (New York, BasicBooks, 2001)
[19]James N. Rosenau. Governance in the twenty-first century. Global Governance (1995) 1(1), 13–43.
[20]Chris C. Demchak and Peter J. Dombrowski,”Rise of a CyberedWestphalian Age: The Coming Decades,” in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, ed. Mayer Maximilian, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, (New York: Springer,2014) Vol. 1, No. 1,pp.104
[21]Chris C. Demchak and Peter J. Dombrowski,”Rise of a CyberedWestphalian Age: The Coming Decades,” in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, ed. Mayer Maximilian, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, (New York: Springer,2014) Vol. 1, No. 1,pp.104
[22]Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.249-272
[23]Linda Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,1998)
[24]Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in question (Cambridge, MA: Polity,1999)
[25]Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002)
[26]Alan M. Rugman, The End of Globalization. (New York: Random House, 2001)
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[32]John Baylis, The Globalization of World Politics.(Oxford: Oxford University Press Inc,2011) p.237
[33]Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.8-15
[34]Martha Finnemore., “International organizations as teachers of norms: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and science policy,” International Organization 47, 4, Autumn 1993, pp. 565-597
[35]Stefan Fritsch,” Conceptualizing the Ambivalent Role of Technology in International Relations: Between Systemic Change and Continuity,” in The Global Politics of Science and Technology, ed. Mayer Maximilian, Mariana Carpes, and Ruth Knoblich, (New York: Springer,2014) Vol. 1, No. 1,pp.125
[36]Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997)
[37]Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” American Political ScienceReview 95, 1, 2001, pp.1–13
[38]Markus Thiel and Jeffrey Maslanik, Transnational Actors Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies, Mar 2010
[39]SaskiaSassen, “On the Internet and Sovereignty,” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5, Spring 1998, p. 551
[40]Robert J. Holton, Global Networks (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008)
[41]Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union (concluded 22 December 1992, entered into force 1 July 1994) 1825 UNTS 143 (hereinafter ‘ITU Constitution’).
[42]Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (signed 23 November 2001, entered into force 1 July 2004)
[43]Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security (signed 16 June 2009, entered into force 5 January 2012) (‘Yekaterinburg Agreement’).
[44]African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (signed 27 June 2014) AU Doc EX.CL/846(XXV).
[45]Oona A. Hathaway et al, “The Law of Cyber-Attack,” California Law Review100, 2012 pp.817-882
[46]Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkin, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998)
[47]Johan Sigholm, “Non-State Actors in Cyberspace Operations,” Journal of Military Studies, 20134, 1, pp.9–23
[48]Kubo Macak, “Is the international law of cyber security in crisis?,”in Peacetime Regime for State Activities in Cyberspace: International Law, International Relations and Diplomacy, ed.Ziolkowski Katharina (Tallinn, Estonia : NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2013),127-139.
[49]Kubo Macak, “Is the international law of cyber security in crisis?,” 127-139.
[50]Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin‐Andersson, Transnational governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
[51]Klaus, Dingwerth, The New Transnationalism (New York: Palgrave,2007) p.3
[52]Angela McKay et al, International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-Dependent World (Microsoft 2014) <http://aka.ms/cybernorms>.
[53]Angela McKay et al, International Cybersecurity Norms: Reducing Conflict in an Internet-DependentWorld (Microsoft 2014) <http://aka.ms/cybernorms> 2–3.
[54]Suzanne Choney, ‘6 Proposed Cybersecurity Norms Could Reduce Conflict’, Microsoft: The Fire Hose
(5 December 2014) <https://blogs.microsoft.com/firehose/2014/12/05/6-proposed-cybersecurity-normscould-reduce-conflict>.
[55]Michael N. Schmitt , Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare: prepared by the International Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 6th ed.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016.) p.42
[56]Ibid.,11.
[57]Ibid., 5.
[58]Ibid., 6.
[59]Ibid., 1.
[60]Madeline Carr, US Power and the Internet in International Relations: The Irony of the Information Age (New York :Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p.117
[61]Stephen M. Walt, “Taming American Power,” Foreign Affairs, 2005 84, 5, p.107
[62]Carr, US Power and the Internet in International Relations, p.117.
[63]Ibid.,118.
[64]Ibid., 119.
[65]Ibid., 119.
[66]Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S.Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2005)
[67]Joseph S. Nye Jr, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s OnlySuperpower Can’t Go It Alone(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
[68]Carr, US Power and the Internet in International Relations, p.117
By Tuesday Orina Masaki